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CHEMICAL BANK V WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER
SUPPLY SYSTEM: THE QUESTIONABLE USE OF
THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE TO
INVALIDATE GOVERNMENTAL TAKE-ORPAY OBLIGATIONS
In Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Suppo System I (WPPSS),
the Supreme Court of Washington released the municipal participants
in a nuclear generator construction project from their agreements to unconditionally service the project debt on the ground that the participants did not have the statutory authority to enter into such
agreements. The project debt consists of revenue bonds issued by the
2
Washington Public Power Supply System, the joint operating agency
responsible for constructing the nuclear plants. The participants had
agreed to service the debt, which totalled $2.2 billion in principal and
$4.75 billion in interest,3 in return for an exclusive share of "project
'4
capability."
The WPPSS case, which sent tremors through the municipal bond
market, is thought to threaten the viability of ongoing analogous arrangements in states with similar statutory schemes.5 Serious flaws in
the court's reasoning, however, should significantly undercut the case's
precedential value. This Note identifies and explains these flaws and
suggests an alternative analysis.
I
BACKGROUND

In recent years, numerous state legislatures have enacted joint operating agency (JOA) statutes. 6 These statutes empower municipal entities 7 to conclude intergovernmental agreements under the provisions of
1 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
2 See infra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
3 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1982, at 31, col. 3.
4 See infia note 37.
5 Over 30 states have passed enabling legislation for joint operating agencies (JOA's).
Ferdon, Power Utilities Realize Cost Benefits on joint Agenc Take or Pay Contracts, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
25, 1982, at 17, col. 1;see, e.g. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1321-:1337 (West Supp. 1983);Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 393.700-.770 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
6 See supra note 2.
7 Because the JOA statutes of various states discussed herein authorize several specified
types of political subdivisions to operate under their provisions and because the subdivisions
so authorized vary from state to state, this Note will use the term "municipal entities" to
designate all these various political subdivisions. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1332
(West Supp. 1983) ("parishes or municipalities"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.360 (1983)
("cities or public utility districts or combinations thereof').
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the statutes.8 The JOA statutes authorize the sponsoring entities to create by resolutions of their municipal governing bodies a joint operating
agency that acts as the governing bodies' agency or instrumentality. 9
The agency is managed by a board of directors comprised of representatives of the sponsoring muncipal entities. The representatives exercise
voting rights in proportion to their municipal entity's interest in the project. I0 The agency so created is deemed a "body corporate."'"
Because a chief aim of the JOA statutes is to facilitate the development of energy resources, I2 joint operating agencies are particularly useful to municipal entities interested in energy production. A joint
operating agency facilitates the finance and construction of billion-dollar generating and transmission facilities by allowing the municipal entities in a project to share the capital costs and risks associated with such
facilities.' 3 The JOA also allows the municipal entities to obtain significant additional benefits, including high leverage 14 and lower overall
5
capital costs.'

The JOA statutes empower the agencies to issue revenue bonds in
their corporate names to finance the costs of the construction, acquisition, or improvement of public projects.' 6 This relieves the sponsoring
municipal entities (members) from compliance with earnings tests, rate
covenants, and other bond indenture restrictions that would apply if
they issued their own bonds. 1 7 Furthermore, allowing the JOA's to issue
bonds in their own names reduces overall financing costs due to the
economy and efficiency of a single large financing as opposed to several
smaller financings.' 8
The members are not directly obligated to pay the debt of the joint
8

Ste, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1324-:1324.1

(West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN.

STAT. § 393.710 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
9 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1332 (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.52.360 (1983).
10

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1332 (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 43.52.370 (1983).
11 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1332 (West Supp. 1983); see also WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.52.360 (1983) ("municipal corporation").
12 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1337 (West Supp. 1983); Public Utility Joint Operating Agencies Act of 1957, 1957 Wash. Laws 1171-72 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.52.360 (1983)).
13 See Worenklein, Project FinancingofJoint Ventures, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 3, 1981, at
40-41.
14
"Leveraging" or "trading on the equity" is the use of debt to increase the expected
return on equity by employing the borrowed funds at a rate of return higher than their cost.
R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 760 (1981).
15 See Worenklein, supra note 13, at 40-41.
16 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1334(A) (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.52.3411 (1983).
17 See Ferdon, supra note 5, at 17.
18 See id
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operating agency.19 Rather, lenders to the agency, the purchasers of the
agency's revenue bonds, "must base their credit evaluations on the ability of the project as a whole to generate enough cash revenues to service
the debt of the [agency] and to meet its other expenses." 2 0° But because
of the difficulty a JOA would have in marketing the wholly unsecured
bonds of a project that has no history of performance, 2 1 the members, as
well as any other municipal entities participating in the project on a
non-member basis (participants), generally provide credit support 22 to
secure the debt of the operating agency. This credit support can take
various forms, the most significant of which are obligations to provide
the capital funds needed to complete the project and obligations to
make payment for the capacity and energy provided by the project in
23
an amount sufficient to service the project debt.
If the municipal entities are obligated to make payments for the
capacity and energy of a project under all circumstances, which is frequently the case, 24 the payment obligation is referred to as "dry-hole
risk."'25 In effect, the municipal entities undertaking such an obligation
unconditionally guarantee the agency's bonds; if a project is terminated
or its operation is curtailed or suspended, payments from the municipal
entities involved would remain due in order to service the project debt
even though the entities would receive nothing from the project.
Although these "dry-hole" provisions seem onerous, municipal entities are willing to undertake them because the provisions ensure that the
agency's bonds are marketable at commercially feasible rates. 26 The
"dry-hole" provisions place the several credits of all participating municipal entities behind the bonds, rather than only the single credit of
the JOA, and allocate the risk of non-completion to the municipal entities, thus assuring investors of the security of the investment. 27 This
credit support also allows the agency to finance the project on a highly
19

See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:1334(A), (C) (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REv.

CODE ANN. § 43.52.3411 (1983); see also Worenklein, supra note 13, at 40.
20

Worenklein, supra note 13, at 40.

21

See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.

22 ' Worenklein, supra note 13, at 40. Mr. Worenklein defines "credit support" as "the

provision of credit substance (through contractual obligations by creditworthy entities to provide revenues or to assume certain risks) to support the likelihood of timely and complete debt
repayment by the [operating agency] (an entity which would otherwise not be
creditworthy)." Id at 40 n.3.
23 See Worenklein, supra note 13 at 40.
24 See Ferdon, supra note 5, at 18.
25 "Dry-hole risk" is the term adopted by the WPPSS court for this type of financing
arrangement. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 78586, 666 P.2d 329, 336 (1983). The financial community also refers to such payment obligations as "hell-or-high water" or "take-or-pay" obligations. See Worenklein, supra note 13, at
40. This Note will employ the court's terminology throughout.
26 See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
27 See id
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leveraged basis, which lowers the capital contribution that each partici28
pating municipal entity must make.
In sum, these "dry-hole" provisions play a key role in facilitating
the marketing of the JOA's bonds, thereby allowing the participating
municipal entities to enjoy the benefits of using a JOA to finance and
construct energy facilities.
II
THE CASE

The Washington Public Power Supply System (Supply System) is a
joint operating agency established in 1957 pursuant to chapter 43.52 of
the Washington Revised Code.29 The Supply System is an organization
of twenty-three Washington municipal entities (members), consisting of
nineteen public utility districts (PUD's) and four cities. 30 It is a municipal corporation 3 with authority to construct, acquire, operate, and
32
maintain facilities for the generation and transmission of electricity.
The Supply System also has the power to issue revenue bonds payable
33
from the revenues of the facilities it operates.
In 1976, the Supply System entered into identical agreements with
eighty-eight municipal entities (participants) in which the Supply System contracted to construct two nuclear power plants, "WNP-4" and
"WNP-5. '34 Twenty of the Supply System's twenty-three members were
among the eighty-eight participants who entered into these "Partici'35
pants' Agreements.
The Participants' Agreements provided that the Supply System
would own WNP-4 entirely and ninety percent of WNP-5; Pacific
Power and Light Company would own ten percent of WNP-5. 36 The
Supply System obtained financing for the projects by issuing revenue
bonds in the Supply System's name pursuant to a Supply System Bond
Resolution adopted in 1977.
Each Participant's Agreement stated that the "Supply System
hereby sells, and the Participant hereby purchases, its Participant's
See Worenklein, supra note 13, at 40; see also supra note 14 (discussing leveraging).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 43.52 (1983).
30 Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 666
P.2d 329, 331 (1983).
31
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.250 (1983).
32 Id. § 43.52.300(2).
33 Id § 43.52.3411.
34
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 776-77, 666 P.2d at 331-32.
35
Motion for Reconsideration of Chemical Bank and Washington Public Power System
app. I, at A-1, WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 [hereinafter cited as Motion for
Reconsideration].
36 See Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Projects Nos. 4 and 5, Participants' Agreement § 25 (1976) (incorporating § 1.1(o) of the Bond Resolution) [hereinafter
cited as Participants' Agreement]; see also inra note 54 (text of § 1.1
(o) of Bond Resolution).
28
29
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share of Project Capability. '37 Each Agreement also contained a "dryhole" provision, requiring each participant to make monthly payments
of its proportionate share of a "Billing Statement," which reflected project costs and included finance charges on the revenue bonds, whether
or not the projects were ever completed, operable, or operating. 38 Termination of the projects established a trigger date for the "dry-hole"
39
payments.
On January 22, 1982, the Supply System terminated the projects
due to cost overruns, thus triggering the participants' payment obligations under the "dry-hole" provisions of their Agreements. 40 In response
to rumors indicating some participants' unwillingness to honor these obligations, 4' Chemical Bank, the trustee for the bondholders, filed suit on
May 20, 1982, in Washington Superior Court. 42 Chemical Bank sought
a declaratory judgment affirming the participants' obligation to make
their monthly payments to the Supply System to cover the principal and
interest due the bondholders.
After the trial court granted Chemical Bank's motion for summary
judgment on some issues, 43 the Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide whether the Washington 44 participants had
the necessary statutory authority to enter into the Participants' AgreeParticipants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 5. "Project Capability" is defined in § 1(v)
37
of the Participants' Agreement as:
[T]he amounts of electric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are
capable of generating at any particular time (including times when either or
both of the Plants are not operable or operating or the operation therof is
suspended, interrupted, interfered with, reduced or curtailed, in each case in
whole or in part for any reason whatsoever), less Project station use and losses.
38
Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 6(d). The provision reads:
The Participant shall make the payments to be made to Supply System
under this Agreement whether or not any of the Projects are completed, operable or operating and notwithstanding the suspension, interruption, interference, reduction or curtailment of the output of either Project for any reason
whatsoever in whole or in part. Such payments shall not be subject to any
reduction, whether by offset or otherwise, and shall not be conditioned upon
the performance or nonperformance by Supply System or any other Participant or entity under this or any other agreement or instrument, the remedy
for any non-performance being limited to mandamus, specific performance or
other legal or equitable remedy.

Id
Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 1(a), (g).
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1982, at 31, col. 3.
41
See N.Y. Times, May 21, 1982, at Dl, col. 6.
See WPPSS, No. 82-2-06840-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. filed May 20, 1982).
42
43
See WPPSS, No. 82-2-06840-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. summary judgment motion granted,
Nov. 16, 1982).
44
The state supreme court's review was limited to the question of whether the Washington participants in the projects had the authority to enter into the Participants' Agreements.
The authority of the Idaho, Oregon, Wyoming, and Nevada participants was being litigated
concurrently in their respective states. See WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 781 n.2, 666 P.2d at 334
n.2.
39

40
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ments and the Bond Resolution. 45 The municipal participants are
"creatures of statute," possessing only those powers conferred on them
by their charters or by other laws, and those powers necessarily implied
by or incident to their expressly granted powers. 46 Thus, without the
requisite statutory authority, the Participants' Agreements and the participants' payment obligations contained in the Agreements would be
void. Although the Supreme Court identified three possible statutory
sources of authority, 4 7 it rejected all three, concluding that the agree48
ments were ultra vires.
The first possible source of authority was the provision in the municipal participants' enumerated powers that authorized each participant to buy and sell electricity on behalf of its residents. 49 The court
held, however, that the power to purchase electricity did not authorize
45 See id. at 781, 666 P.2d at 334. The state supreme court limited its review to the
statutory authority questions and did not address the other issues presented by the parties,
including: the participants' right to a jury; the Supply System's statutory authority to enter
into the Participants' Agreements and the Bond Resolution and to issue the bonds pursuant
thereto; the constitutional and statutory limitations on the incurring of debt or the lending of
credit by the municipal participants; and the interpretation of the agreements as to payment
terms.
46
2 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.09 (rev. 3d ed.
1979); see State v. Krueger, 67 Wash. 2d 673, 409 P.2d 458 (1965) (cities are creatures of
sovereign state).
47 The WPPSS court also discussed a fourth possible statutory source of express authority in its opinion, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. CH. 54.44 (1983) ("Nuclear, Thermal, Electric
Generating Power Facilities - Joint Development"), even though the parties in WPPSS did
not rely on this statute. The court noted that certain requirements of chapter 54.44 were
"notably absent" from the Participants' Agreements, particularly the ownership requirement
of§ 54.44.020. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 794-97, 666 P.2d at 341-42. Additionally, the agreements
included a "step-up" provision, whereby the remaining participants would assume the liabilities of any defaulting participant on a prorata basis, which is prohibited by the statute. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.44.030. 99 Wash. 2d at 794-97, 666 P.2d at 341-42. The court
also examined whether the power to enter into a financing arrangement like that at issue in
WPPSS could be implied from the express statutory authority to acquire or construct generating facilities and provide electricity but concluded that it could not. See id. at 791-94, 666
P.2d at 339-40.
48 See id at 798, 666 P.2d at 342.
49
The 19 Washington PUD's involved in WPPSS are authorized to "purchase, within or
without [their] limits, electric current for sale and distribution within or without [their] limits ...
." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.16.040 (1962).
The grant of authority applicable to the various Washington municipal WPPSS participants varies according to the class of city or town to which each belongs:
First class cities are authorized to: "provide for lighting the streets and all
public places, and for furnishing the inhabitants thereof with gas or other
lights. . . ." Id § 35.22.280(15). Second class cities are authorized to: "provide for lighting the streets and all public places of the city and for furnishing
the inhabitants of the city with gas, electric or other light ..
" Id
§ 35.23.440(45). Third class cities and towns are authorized to "drain, sprinkle and light [streets, sidewalks, alleys, squares and other public highways and
places within the city]." Id §§ 35.24.290(3), 35.27.370(4). Code cities are authorized to "provide utility service within and without its limits and exercise
all powers to the extent authorized by general law for any class of city or
town." Id § 35A.80.010.
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the purchase of "project capability," reasoning that the possibility existed that no electricity would ever be generated, and thus that none
would actually be "purchased." 50
The second source of authority the court considered was a statute
authorizing the participants to construct or acquire electric generating
facilities. 5 ' The municipal entities "clearly had the authority to build or
buy their own plants."' 52 The court stated, however, that "[a]s a matter
of public policy, the enormous risk to ratepayers [of loss by their municipal entity's involvement in a joint development project] must be balanced by either the benefit of ownership or substantial management
control."'5 3 The court then found that the participants retained no ownership interest in the projects. It based this finding solely on the language of the Bond Resolution, 54 which provided that only the Supply
System and Pacific Power and Light Company retained any "ownership
interest" in the projects.
Although the municipal participants were not expressly authorized to "purchase" electricity, it is generally held that "a [municipal entity] having power to provide light for its
streets has implied power to purchase the light of others and to enter into a contract for that
service." 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 34.129.
It should be noted that the court concentrated on the narrow language of the power
granted to PUD's ("purchase . . . electric current," WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 54.16.040
(1962)) but disregarded the fact that the powers granted to the other participants are set forth
in broader language. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.23.440(35) (1965) (second class
cities granted power "[t]o make all . . . contracts or agreements for the use or benefit of the
city"); id § 35.24.410 (third class cities may "contract for supplying the city with water, light,
power, and heat for municipal purposes").
50 WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 783-84, 666 P.2d at 335.
5i WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.92.050 (1983) provides:
A city or town may also construct, condemn and purchase, purchase,
acquire, add to, maintain and operate works, plants, facilities for the purpose
of furnishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and any other persons, with
gas, electricity, and other means of power and facilities for lighting, heating,
fuel, and power purposes, public and private, with full authority to regulate
and control the use, distribution, and price thereof, together with the right to
handle and sell or lease, any meters, lamps, motors, transformers, and equipment or accessories of any kind, necessary and convenient for the use, distribution, and sale therof; authorize the construction of such plant or plants by
others for the same purpose, and purchase gas, electricity, or power from
either within or without the city or town for its own use and for the purpose of
selling to its inhabitants and to other persons doing business within the city or
town and regulate and control the use and price thereof.
See also id § 54.16.040 (PUD's authorized to "construct" and "acquire" generating facilities).
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 784-85, 666 P.2d at 335-36.
52
53 Id at 788, 666 P.2d at 337.
54 See Id at 785-86, 666 P.2d at 336.
Section 1.1(o) of the Bond Resolution reads as follows: "The term 'Ownership Share'
shall mean the [Supply] System's undivided ownership interest in the WPPSS No. 5 Project
. . .and the [Supply] System's complete ownership interest in the WPPSS No. 4 Project."
Although the participants were not direct parties to the Bond Resolution, the Participants' Agreements provided that the Supply System must comply with the Bond Resolution
and that the Agreements are subject to the terms of the Bond Resolution. See Participants'
Agreement, supra note 36, § 25.
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The court went on to determine whether the participants retained
sufficient management control to constitute "the equivalent of an ownership interest."5 5 Although the Agreements called for the establishment of a "Participants' Committee" to approve or disapprove major
decisions relating to the management of the projects, 56 the court concluded that the "rigid procedural requirements" under which the Committee labored precluded "meaningful deliberation" of Supply System
proposals and therefore precluded "significant input" in the management of the projects. 5 7 Because the participants lacked both a titular
"ownership interest" and any "equivalent of an ownership interest" in
the projects, the court ruled that the participants were not engaged in
the construction or acquisition of an electric generating facility within
the meaning of the authorizing statute.
Having found that the participants did not have the authority to
enter into the Agreements under the statutory provisions empowering
the participants to purchase electricity and to acquire or construct generating facilities, the court turned to the third possible statutory source
of authority: the joint operating agency chapter under which the Supply System was created.5 8 Phrased in language similar to that used to
set out the participants' enumerated powers discussed above, the JOA
chapter authorizes the participants to "purchase . . . electric energy"
from a JOA.5 9 The court interpreted the language of the JOA chapter
in the same way it did the enumerated powers provisions and found that
the JOA chapter did not authorize the participants to purchase project
capability. 60
Judge Utter, in a dissenting opinion joined by Judge Dolliver, criti-"
cized the majority's narrow reading 6' of the participants' authority, contending that the majority placed "constraints on municipalities not
55 WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
For the purposes of this section, the Note retains the court's original terminology, distinguishing between an "ownership interest" and the "equivalent of an ownership interest." In
a subsequent section, however, the Note attempts to refute the analysis underlying this terminology, rendering this terminology meaningless. See in/ra notes 111-48 and accompanying
text.
56 See Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 15; in/ia notes 123-26 and accompanying
text.
57
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337; see also in/ra note 128 (objectionable
procedural requirement).
58 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 43.52 (1983).
59 Id § 43.52.410. This section provides: "Any city or district is authorized to enter into
contracts or compacts with any operating agency or a publicly or privately owned public
utility for the purchase and sale of electric energy or falling waters."
60 See 99 Wash. 2d at 794, 666 P.2d at 340-41.
61 Judge Dore, in a concurring opinion, applied an even more restrictive interpretation
ofthe statute. He rejected the majority's "equivalent of an ownership interest" analysis of the
second potential source of statutory authority. Judge Dore asserted that "both an ownership
interest and active participation in the management of the facilities are mandatory" to find
that the participants were constructing or acquiring electric generating facilities within the
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intended by the Legislature. '6 2 The dissent argued for a broad reading
of the relevant statutes, especially those authorizing the purchase of electricity, "to further their purpose of furnishing power to the people." 6 3
Judge Utter asserted that courts must provide municipal entities "the
flexibility which is absolutely crucial in furnishing such a capital-intensive service."' 64 The dissent concluded that to provide this flexibility,
courts should review the means by which municipal entities choose to
furnish power to their citizens only to the extent that those means are
"arbitrary and capricious. ' 65
III
ANALYSIS

In Chemical Bank v. Washington Power Supply System (WPPSS),66 the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that none of the three possible
statutory sources of authority for the Participants' Agreements authorized the municipal participants to enter into these Agreements. Alternative interpretations of the statutes, however, were both possible and
warranted in this case. These alternative interpretations suggest that all
three statutory sources of authority examined by the court did authorize
the participants to enter into the Participants' Agreements.
First, the court should have liberally construed the statutes empowering the participants to purchase electricity. A broader construction of
this power accords with the general rule of statutory construction applicable to municipal proprietary powers. 67 Had the court liberally construed the participants' power to purchase electricity, it would have
found statutory authority for the participants' purchase of "project
'68
capability.
Second, the court should have employed a more traditional corporate definition of ownership interest rather than a less meaningful titular
definition in determining whether the participants were acquiring or
constructing facilities within the meaning of the empowering statute.6 9
meaning of the empowering statute. Id at 800, 666 P.2d at 343-44 (Dore, J., concurring)(emphasis in original).
The concurrence also addressed the issues of municipal debt limitations and contract
interpretation, which the trial court ruled on but which the supreme court majority, exercising its discretionary review power, declined to address. This Note likewise will refrain from
addressing these issues.
62 Id at 810, 666 P.2d at 348 (Utter, J., dissenting). The dissent also did not reach the
additional issues addressed in the trial court.
63 Id at 811, 666 P.2d at 349.
64 Id at 810, 666 P.2d at 348.
65 Id. at 813-14, 666 P.2d at 350.
66 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
67 See infta notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
68 See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
69 See infra text accompanying note 117.
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Under a corporate definition, the participants retained sufficient ownership interest to satisfy any ownership requirement "envisioned in the
statutes."70
Third, the court's interpretation of the JOA chapter as not authorizing the participants to assume "dry-hole" risk precludes a major source
of financing for joint agency development projects. 71 This defeats a major purpose of the JOA chapter and renders it ineffectual in contravention of well-established rules of statutory construction. 72 The court,
therefore, should have interpreted the JOA chapter as authorizing the
participants to enter into the Participants' Agreements.
A. The Participants' Power to "Purchase Electricity"
The WPPSS court's conclusion that the participants' power to
"purchase electricity" did not extend to the purchase of project capability resulted from its strict construction of the authorizing statutes. Generally, courts must strictly construe the powers granted to municipal
entities. 73 For the reasons set forth below, however, a liberal construction of the relevant statutes was appropriate in this case. If the court
had liberally construed the various empowering statutes, it would have
concluded that the statutes authorize the purchase of project capability.
1. Proprietay vs. Governmental Powers
In construing statutory grants of municipal powers, courts often
distinguish between "governmental" powers and "proprietary" powers. 74 Governmental powers are those conferred on the municipal entity
as a local agency of limited jurisdiction for the purpose of administering
the affairs of the state and promoting the state's interest. 75 In exercising
a governmental power, the municipal entity is dispensing or exercising
70

WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337; see infra
notes 117-48 and accompany-

ing text.
71 See infia notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
72 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
73 See City of N. Sacramento v. Citizens Utils. Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 483, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 538, 539 (1961); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.18a.
74 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.22; see also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v.
Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 17 Wash. App. 861, 863, 565 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1977) (recognizing this
distinction in Washington).
75 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.05; see also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v.
Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 17 Wash. App. 861, 863, 565 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1977) (in its governmental "character," a municipality acts as agency of state); E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1956). As Yokley explains:
Among typical governmental functions of a municipality may be mentioned:
the levy of properly authorized taxes, the assessment and collection of its proportion of the state tax, police regulations, suppression of crime, protection of
the public health, the exercise of eminent domain, the operation of a fire department and the administration of justice.
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some element of sovereignty. 76 Because sovereign powers potentially
may encroach upon municipal citizens' personal rights and liberties,
these powers must be strictly construed so as to minimize such
77
encroachment.
Proprietary powers are "those relating to the accomplishment of
private corporate purposes."' 78 These powers are conferred for the spe79
In
cific benefit and advantage of the municipal entity's inhabitants.
the exercise of a proprietary power, "the municipality is largely con80
trolled by the rules governing private individuals or corporations,"
and its power is "to be construed with liberality, to the end that the
purpose of the grant may be fully accomplished.""' The policy behind
this rule is analogous to the policy underlying the "business judgment"
rule 82 governing the conduct of directors of private corporations: to encourage entrepreneurial behavior, which benefits all those within the
corporation, by leaving much to the discretion and judgment of the
8 3
decisionmakers.
Courts generally have held that a municipal entity is exercising a
proprietary power when it contracts for the supply of water, light, or gas
to its inhabitants. 84 In applying the general rule of liberal statutory con2 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.22; see a/so Certain Lots Upon Which Taxes are
Delinquent v. Town of Monticello, 159 Fla. 134, 142, 31 So. 2d 905, 910 (1947) (delegated
corporate powers that may limit rights of citizens are strictly construed).
77 See Certain Lots Upon Which Taxes are Delinquent v. Town of Monticello, 159 Fla.
134, 142, 31 So. 2d 905, 910 (1947); State v. Hackman, 273 Mo. 670, 690, 202 S.W. 7, 11
(1918).
78
2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.05.
79
Id;see also City of Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560, 565, 104 P. 834, 835 (1909) (proprietary powers are conferred "for the private advantage of the compact community which is
incorporated as a distinct legalpersonality or corporate individual") (citation omitted).
80 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.22; see also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v.
Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 17 Wash. App. 861, 863, 565 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1977) (In its proprietary "character," a municipality "acts as a private business.").
81 Butler v. Karb, 96 Ohio St. 472, 481, 117 N.E. 953, 955 (1917); see also Puget Sound
Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 17 Wash. App. 861, 864, 565 P.2d 1221, 1223
(1977) ("In its [proprietary] character, [the municipal corporation] is implicitly authorized to,
make all contracts and to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system
efficient and beneficial to the public."); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.22.
See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS EN82
76

TERPRISES § 242 (3d ed. 1983).

See Butler v. Karb, 96 Ohio St. 472, 482, 117 N.E. 953, 955-56 (1917) ("[S]uccessful
and satisfactory management and operation of a city's utilities could not be accomplished if
[the city officials] were hedged about and hampered by detailed, minute, and precise regulations, directions, or restrictions, either legislative or judicial."); see also 0. POND, A TREATISE
83

ON THE LAWS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES OPERATING IN CITIES AND TOWNS § 11 (1913)

("[Tlhe

discretion of municipal corporations . . . is . . . not subject to judicial control" except in

cases of fraud or gross abuse of discretion.).
84 See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 34.126; see a/so Linne v. Bredes, 43 Wash. 540,
546, 86 P. 858, 860-61 (1906) (citing Appeal of Brumm, 9 Sadler 483, 485, 12 A. 855, 856 (Pa.
Mar. 5, 1888) ("A municipal corporation which supplies its inhabitants with gas or water
").
does so in its capacity of a private corporation .
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struction to these specific proprietary powers, "the courts permit and
favor the exercise of the fullest discretion in the enjoyment and administration of such [proprietary] powers which are [sic] consistent with the
general object of their grant,"8 5 and which does not contravene any express limitations on the method of executing the powers contained in
their grant.8 6 The "general object" of the grant of power to "purchase
electricity" is to empower the municipal entity to furnish its residents
with electricity. 87

This purpose is broad and comprehensive;

the

purchase of project capability by a municipal entity is a means consistent with the general object of the grant. Furthermore, the grant of
power does not prescribe the mode of contracting to be used to carry out
the power. 88 The signing of the Participants' Agreements by the municipal participants in WPPSS thus is clearly an exercise of discretion consistent with the general object of the grant of a proprietary power and
not in contravention of any express limitations on that grant.
In reviewing a municipal entity's use of its discretion in the exercise
of a proprietary power, a court must adopt a standard of reasonableness,
invalidating only those actions found to be arbitrary and capricious. 89
A reasonableness standard serves two purposes. First, it prevents a court
from substituting its own judgment for that of the municipal entity's
elected officials in an area more properly reserved to those officials. Second, a stricter standard of review would unreasonably restrict a municipal entity's discretion in exercising a proprietary power, thus preventing
the municipal entity from exercising that power as efficiently as a similarly situated private corporation would. In his dissenting opinion in
85 0. POND, supra note 83, § 11.
86 See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.27.
87 See Stateexrel. PUD No. 1 v. Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d 113, 150, 182 P.2d 706, 726 (1947)
("The primary purpose of the power granted to a public utility district [to 'purchase . . .
electric current for sale and distribution' and 'to construct, . . . acquire, . . . and operate'
generating facilities] by subsection (d) of § 6, chapter 1, Laws of 1931, Rem. Rev. Stat.
§ 11610(d), is to furnish the district, and the inhabitants thereof, with electric current
88
89

See supra note 49 (text of authorizing statutes).
2 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.33; see also Lincoln School Township v. Union

Trust Co., 36 Ind. App. 113, 116-17, 73 N.E. 623, 624 (1905); State ex rel Public Util. Dist.
No. I v. Schwab, 40 Wash. 2d 814, 829-31, 246 P.2d 1081, 1089-90 (1952) (In providing for
the future energy requirements of the district, PUD commissioners' determinations of the
district's prospective load growth will be accepted by the courts in passing upon the question
of whether a proposed hydroelectric project is unreasonably large unless it is shown that the
commissioners acted "arbitrarily or capriciously."). The court in Lincoln School Township
explained:
[W]here the grant is of a business or proprietary character, to be exercised in
an administrative manner for the benefit of the particular community - as,
for instance, entering into a contract for the benefit of the community while such action may be attacked on the ground of fraud, it cannot be reviewed upon the ground that the local authorities have not contracted prudently and discreetly.
36 Ind. App. at 116-17, 73 N.E. at 624.
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WPPSS, Judge Utter recognized the dangers of abandoning the reasonableness standard and pointed out the clear need to provide municipal
entities with "the flexibility which is absolutely crucial in furnishing
such a capital-intensive service" as nuclear energy. 90
If the court in WPPSS had applied a reasonableness standard, it
would have upheld the participants' purchase of project capability.
First, the participants were faced with what they believed to be the prospect of insufficient energy resources to meet the needs of their residents.91 The Participant's Agreements entered into in July 1976 offered
the participants the opportunity to obtain a block of energy capacity
that they could control at cost, with no markup or profit to the constructing entity.92 Furthermore, the participants could acquire this capacity without expending any of their own capital until the projects
were either operating or terminated. 93 Second, the risk of a "dry-hole"
that so concerned the WPPSS court was a risk that each participant
would have borne in any event; if each participant had undertaken a
separate, smaller project rather than participating in one larger project
through the Supply System, it would have had to shoulder the "dryhole" risk for its own project alone.9 4 Third, the participants knew that
the Supply System would have no significant source of funds to pay
project and construction costs aside from bond sale revenues. 95 Thus,
each participant covenanted to charge and collect rates sufficient to pay
the Supply System its "Participant's Share" of all project costs, including debt service. 96 Fourth, the participants knew that bond purchasers
would require a guarantee of payment if the bonds were to be sold at a
price that would be commercially feasible for the Supply System. 9 7 Finally, the participants had bargained for and secured significant rights
to oversee and control project development through the Participants'
Committee. 98

All of these factors suggest that the participants' actions were reasonable and thus were beyond judicial reproach. The court should have
99 Wash. 2d at 810, 666 P.2d at 348 (Utter, J., dissenting).
"Participant City of Ellensburg, for example, concluded that 'without participation
in WNP-4 and 5, it would have 25% less power than required to serve the anticipated electricity needs of its customers after 1983.' " Brief of Washington Public Power Supply System Re
Statement of Case, Motion to Strike Brief, and Jury Issue at 10-11, WPPSS, No. 82-2-06840-3
(Wash. Super. Ct. filed May 20, 1982) (quoting affidavit of Robert Walker, filed in support of
Ellensburg's motion and memorandum).
92
See Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 1.
93
Id §§ 1(g), 6(a).
94
The size of a loss resulting from a "dry-hole" in a smaller project of course would be
proportionately smaller.
95
See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
96
See Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, §§ 5, 6(c).
97
See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
98
See infra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
90

91
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held, therefore, that the participants' power to purchase electricity authorized them to purchase project capability.
2. Cases in Other States
The decisions of several courts in other states support the proposition that statutory authority to purchase electricity should be broadly
construed to permit project capability purchases. 99 Each decision addressed the question of whether a JOA and a municipal participant had
the authority to enter into contracts that involved the purchase of power
from a plant not yet constructed. In each case, the municipal entities
had promised to pay the costs of the new project, whether it produced
power or not, in return for a share of project capability. The statutes
involved, worded similarly to the Washington authorizing statutes, empowered the participants to purchase electricity but did not explicitly
authorize them to purchase electricity in the form of project capability. 0 0° Nevertheless, the courts liberally construed the various authorizing statutes and uniformly upheld the municipal entities' purchase
agreements.101
For example, in Frank v. City of Cody,' 02 a Wyoming city brought
suit to compel its mayor to sign an agreement with a JOA on behalf of
the city. Among other things, the agreement provided that the city
would pay project costs in return for a share of project capability. The
city was authorized by statute to "purchase electric current."' 0 3 In defense of his refusal to sign the document, the mayor asserted that the city
04
lacked specific statutory authority to enter into such an agreement.1
In rejecting this defense, the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated:
It is apparent that [the city]. . . must get [its] electrical energy from
some source. Where there are no limitations or restrictions as to a mode of
contractingprovidedby the legislatureto carry out a powerplainly and expressly

bestowed upon a municipality, the appropriatemethod is left to the discretion of
municipalauthorities with the usual test of the validity being whether the con99 See Board of Comm'rs v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, and Citizens, 360 S.2d 863
(La. 1978); State ex rel. Mitchell v. City of Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977) (en banc);
State ex rel. Grimes County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977).
100
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4164 (West 1966) ("[m]unicipalities may obtain
. . electric current under contract . . . from private persons"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 91.030
(Vernon 1971) ("[c]ities may purchase light and power"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15-7-204
(1980) ([a]ny city or town may . . . [p]urchase electric current").
101 The fact that the validity of the financial arrangements in these cases was litigated
before, rather than after, a default under the arrangements should not affect the precedential
value of these cases. The policy reasons cited by the courts in upholding these arrangements
are equally compelling in instances where a default occurs before the litigation commences.
102
572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977).
103
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15-7-204 (1980).
104 Frank, 572 P.2d at 1117.
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tract ir reasonable.105

The court went on to find the contract reasonable, noting that the
city's usual source of electrical power had "reached its capacity to supply [such] energy beyond its present commitments," and that no alternative sources existed.' 06 Further, the agreement left the city in a
position to "program its long-range electrical needs and avoid catch-as0 7
catch-can procurement on the open market."'
3.

Washington Statutes

The Frank court drew additional support for its conclusion that the
Wyoming statute authorized the purchase of project capability from a
provision in the Wyoming constitution requiring a liberal construction
of the powers granted to cities and towns.108 Similar mandates exist in
the Washington Code with reference to the powers granted to several of
the municipal participants in the WPPSS projects. 0 9
These statutes evidence Washington's legislative policy of giving
the largest possible measure of self-government to cities and towns, and
any construction of the municipal entities' authorizing statutes must
conform to this policy."t 0 By adopting a strict construction of the municipal participants' powers, the WPPSS court clearly failed to adhere to
this established policy.
B.

The Participants' Power to Acquire Electric Generating
Facilities
The WPPSS court found "[a]s a matter of public policy"'

105
106

that the

Id (emphasis added).
Id at 1118.

Id
Id at 1115 (citing Wyo. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1).
109
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35A.01.010 (1983) (code cities are to exercise the
"broadest powers of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of this state"); id
35A. 11.050 (Special Pamphlet 1983) (powers conferred on code cities "shall be construed
liberally in favor of such cities"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.21.600 (1965) ("Any city of
ten thousand or more population shall have all power to conduct its affairs consistent with
and subject to state law."); id § 35.22.900 (1965) (powers of first class cities are to be liberally
construed); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.910 (1983) (specifically requiring liberal
construction of JOA statutes).
110 See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 10.21. In the past, Washington courts have
consistently adhered to these requirements of liberal construction. See Bayha v. Public Util.
Dist. No. 1, 2 Wash. 2d 85, 98, 97 P.2d 614, 620 (1939) ("The legislature has seen fit to vest
the commissioners of a public utility district with almost unlimited powers relative to the
construction, purchase, etc., of utilities, and in the sale of utility revenue bonds to finance
such operations."); Rumbolz v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 22 Wash. 2d 724, 728, 157 P.2d 927,
929 (1945) (powers conferred upon the commissions of PUD's are "extremely broad'); Puget
Sound Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 17 Wash. App. 861, 864, 565 P.2d 1221,
1223 (1977) (Districts are "implicitly authorized to make all contracts and to engage in any
undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public.')
I II
WPPSS 99 Wash. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337.
107

108
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participants' power to "construct" or "acquire" generating facilities'12
did not authorize them to enter into the Participants' Agreements. According to the court's analysis, the participants lacked both an ownership interest in the projects and sufficient involvement in project
management, one of which is necessary to "satisfy the type of ownership
control envisioned in the statutes."'1 13 In so finding, the court ignored
the realities of the situation, misconstrued the statute, and substituted its
judgment for that of the legislature in determining the state's public

policy. 114
1. Actual Ownership Interest and Control
The WPPSS court found that only the Supply System and Pacific
Power & Light Company retained any ownership interest in the
projects. 115 The court based this finding solely on the express terms of
the Supply System's Bond Resolution.1 1 6 In so doing, the court relied
on a titular definition of ownership, rather than on a traditional, and
more meaningful, corporate definition' 17 of ownership. The court's titular definition of ownership is inferior to the corporate definition because
a titular definition fails to identify where the rights commonly associated with a proprietary interest lie.
Under a corporate definition, the proprietary interests in a corpora-

l12

See supra note 51 (quoting authorizing statute).
113 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337. The concurrence's assertions that the retention
of "an ownership interest is an absolute requirement when acquiring or constructing generating facilities," id at 799-800, 666 P.2d at 343 (Dore, J., concurring); supra note 61, seem
unsupported by the authority upon which it implicitly relies. The two cases the majority
cited in support of its position that the supreme court had "never found authority [under the
participants' power to construct or acquire facilities] for a project in which the participants
did not have an ownership interest," 99 Wash. 2d at 785, 666 P.2d at 336, quoted by the
concurrence, id at 799, 666 P.2d at 343, are inapposite. In Roehl v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1,
43 Wash. 2d 214, 261 P.2d 92 (1953) and Stateexrel. Public Util. Dist. No. I v. Schwab, 40
Wash. 2d 814, 246 P.2d 1081 (1952), the issue was not ownership but rather whether the
municipal participants had the authority to construct facilities that would supply power well
beyond the needs of the participants. Furthermore, the Missouri case of State ex re. Mitchell
v. City of Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977) (en banc), provides an example where, although the participants held no ownership interest at all, the court did not even question the
participants' authority to enter into the power sales contracts.
114
In so finding, the WPPSS court may also have violated the due process requirements
of the Washington and United States Constitutions. Due process requires that a party not be
deprived of his property without having had an opportunity to be heard. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-77 (1978). Given that the
parties in the WPPSS action had not directly addressed the issues of control and management, the parties disadvantaged by the WPPSS decision were deprived of their property without having had an opportunity to be heard on those issues. See Motion for Reconsideration,
supra note 35, at 44. The Washington Supreme Court should have remanded these issues to
the trial court in order to allow the parties to be heard.
115 WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 785, 666 P.2d at 336.
116 Id at 785, 666 P.2d at 336; see supra note 54.
117 See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, § 157.
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tion are divided into units termed "shares.""" Share holders retain a
three-fold proportionate interest in the corporation consisting of control
of the corporation, earnings of the corporation, and net assets of the
corporation upon its dissolution." 9 Although the shareholders do not

technically "own" the assets of a corporation, their three-fold interest in
the corporation extends to its assets which are deemed to be held in trust

for them by the corporation. 120 The participants in WPPSS retained
with respect to the projects all the elements of the shareholders' threefold interest. Viewing the WPPSS projects as assets of the Supply System, the participants had an ownership in the projects in much the same
way shareholders of a corporation have an ownership interest in the
assets of the corporation.'21
a. Control of the Corporation. In a corporation, shareholder control
generally consists of the power to vote at shareholder meetings, or to
give written consents, with respect to (i) shareholder resolutions, including ratification of actions of the directors; (ii) extraordinary corporate
matters; (iii) election and removal of the directors; and (iv) adoption,
122
amendment, and repeal of the by-laws.
The WPPSS participants, acting through the Participants' Committee, 123 possessed voting power with regard to the equivalent, in this
context, of shareholder resolutions and extraordinary corporate matters.
The Agreements authorized the Participants' Committee to advance its
own proposals if Committee members representing, twenty percent or
more of the participants' shares approved of the proposal. 12 4 This
power is analogous to corporate shareholders' power to formulate resolutions. The Participants' Committee also possessed a supervisory veto
power over major decisions relating to the management of the projects.
Committee members representing twenty percent or more of the participants' shares could disapprove Supply System proposals by notice of
disapproval. 125 The Agreements explicitly required that various items
be referred to the Participants' Committee, including construction
118
119

See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2(d) (1979).
See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, § 157.

120

See W.F. Boardman Co. v. Petch, 186 Cal. 476, 481, 199 P. 1047, 1050 (Cal. 1921) (a

corporation is the creature of its stockholders and holds its property in trust for them, the
stockholders, as between themselves and the corporation, being the beneficial owners).
121
It is important to note that the interest that the participants held as "shareholders" of
the Supply System extends only to the corporate undertaking surrounding Projects 4 and 5.
The participants retained no interest in the Supply System's other projects or ventures as a
result of the 1976 Participant's Agreements.
122 See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, § 188.
123 Se Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 15(a).

124 See id. § 15(e).
125 See id § 15(d). A vote of disapproval by Committee members representing 20% or
more of the participants' shares would force review of the proposal by a "Project Consultant"
(mediator). Id § 15(e). If the Supply System proposal could be shown to be imprudent in a
hearing before the Project Consultant, that action was to be terminated. Id § 16(b).
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budgets, contracts involving more than $2 million, and proposed bond
resolutions.1 26 In this context, these items are clearly "extraordinary
corporate matters."
The WPPSS court recognized the Participants' Committee's supervisory veto power 2 7 but concluded that the "procedure for committee
consideration of [Supply System] proposals . . . precludes meaningful
deliberation on the part of the committee."' 128 In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently ignored several provisions contained in the
Participants' Agreements that were designed to facilitate "meaningful
deliberation." First, the Agreements obligated the Supply System to
furnish the Participants' Committee "itemized cost estimates and other
details sufficient to support a comprehensive review" of those Supply
System proposals subject to Committee review.' 29 Second, the Agreements afforded the participants a right of access to the Supply System's
books and records concerning WNP-4 and WNP-5 for the purpose of
inspection and audit.' 30 Third, and perhaps most significantly, the
Agreement authorized the Participants' Committee to engage, at the
Supply System's expense, independent "engineering, accounting, legal
and professional personnel . . . to monitor and audit the Projects, to
make periodic reports to the Committee and to perform such other reasonable services as may aid the Committee in the performance of its
13 1
review functions."'
Given these provisions, the participants' right of review of the Supply System's decisions in extraordinary corporate matters was "real and
readily exercisable"; 132 it clearly was not a mere "rubber stamp," as the
126 See id § 15(c).
127 See WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
128 Id, 666 P.2d at 337. The court found especially objectionable, in light of the "complexities" of the various items the Committee would be called upon to consider, the procedure
requiring that 20% of the participants register their disapprovalof any Supply System proposal
within 15 days or that proposal " 'shall be deemed approved.' " Id, 666 P.2d at 337 (quoting
Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 15(c)).
129 Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 15(c).
130 See id § 8(c).
131 Id § 15(g). Furthermore, the court's apparent concern over time constraints on the
Committee's deliberation was needless because a vote of disapproval by participants holding
20% of the projects' shares who wished more time to study a proposal would provide additional time for such review. See id § 15(e).
132 Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 35, at 36. The participants proved this point
on numerous occasions. The participants' disapproval in August 1981 of a proposal to continue financing on the projects led directly to the projects' termination. They disapproved
both the 1983 and 1984 Supply System budgets for WNP-4 and WNP-5, thereby forcing a
review of those budgets by a Project Consultant. See supra note 125 (describing consultant's
role). Further, the participants disapproved a contract settlement proposed by the Supply
System. See Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 35, at 36-37.
It should also be noted in this regard that under the Agreements, the participants retained recourse to "mandamus, specific performance, or other legal or equitable remedy" in
the event of non-performance by the Supply System. See Participants' Agreement, supra note
36, § 6(d). Although not technically providing "management control," this provision ac-
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WPPSS court suggested.1 33 In addition, more elaborate procedures for
Committee consideration of Supply System proposals would have been
neither feasible nor expedient in view of the number of participants in134
volved in the projects.
In addition to the power to vote on shareholder resolutions and
extraordinary corporate matters that all participants held, the twenty
participants who were also members 135 of the Supply System retained
the power to elect the directors and adopt the by-laws of the Supply
System. Each Supply System member was required by statute to ap36
point a representative to the Supply System's board of directors.
These representatives exercised voting rights in proportion to their respective municipal entity's interest in the projects. 37 The representatives were to "adopt rules for the conduct of [the board's] meetings and
the carrying out of its business,"' 138 which effectively constituted the bylaws of the municipal corporation. In substance, these twenty "member-participants" possessed all four forms of shareholder control: the
power to vote on shareholder resolutions; the power to review extraordinary corporate decisions; the power to elect directors; and the power to
39
adopt by-laws.'
b. Earningsof the Corporation. Traditionally, the goal of a for-profit
corporation is to generate earnings for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders. The shareholders are entitled to the corporate earnings in proportion to their share ownership. 40
Although the corporate undertaking in WPPSS was not designed to
produce "earnings" per se, it was created to generate energy for the exclusive benefit of its participants. The participants were entitled to a
share of any energy generated in proportion to their "investment" in the
projects, which was measured by the amount due from them under the
knowledged the fiduciary duty the Supply System owed to the participants, a duty analogous
to that owed by a corporation to its shareholders. As in the case of corporations, the availability of judicial remedies for breach of this duty serves as a deterrent to and a remedy for
instances of improper management on the part of managers, here the Supply System. See
Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1118 (Wyo. 1977)(retention of right to sue for improper
management held to be significant control over joint agency by municipal participant).
133 WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337.
134 See supra text accompanying note 34 (88 municipal participants).
135 See supra text accompanying note 30 (incorporators of Supply System).
136 See WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.52.370(1) (1983).
137 Id
138

Id

139 In addition to the control over the projects they exercised as shareholders, the member-participants, through their appointed representatives on the Supply System's board of
directors, also exercised managerial control as directors over day-to-day corporate matters
and general policy concerns. Given that these 20 member-participants held 96% of the project shares at issue in WPPSS and comprised 88% of the voting power on the Supply System's
board, their control over the projects is clear. See Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 35,
app. I, at Al.
140 See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, § 72.
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terms of the Billing Statement. 14 1 In this sense, the participants' interest
in the projects was similar to a shareholder's interest in the earnings of a
corporation.
c. Net Assets Upon Dissolution. Generally, when a corporation liquidates, its shareholders participate ratably in the assets that remain after
satisfaction of all creditors' claims.' 42 The Participants' Agreements explicitly adopted this rule, allowing the participants to share in the distri43
bution of the projects' assets upon termination of the projects.1
In summary, an examination of the extent to which the WPPSS
participants exhibit the traditional corporate indicia of ownership significantly undermines the WPPSS court's conclusion that the participants lacked an ownership interest in the projects. The court's titular
definition of ownership fails to identify where the rights commonly associated with a proprietary interest lie and thus is inferior to a corporate
definition. If the court had performed the analysis required under a
corporate definition of ownership, it would have concluded that the participants' retention of significant control in the Supply System as well as
their interests in the Supply System's "earnings" and net assets upon
dissolution constituted a sufficient ownership interest in the projects to
satisfy any requirements contained in the authorizing statutes.
2. Equivalence of an Ownership Interest
The court in WPPSS indicated that even if the participants did not
possess actual ownership of the projects, their actions would be valid
under the authorizing statutes if they retained the "equivalent of an
ownership interest" in the project." 44 Under the court's approach, the
participants would have retained the "equivalent of an ownership interest" if they had retained significant control over the projects. 145 The
court found, however, that the participants' role in project management
was too limited to "satisfy the type of ownership control envisioned in
46
the statutes."
Traditional analysis of ownership interest does not include a distinction between an "ownership interest" and the "equivalent of an
ownership interest"; thus, contrary to the WPPSS court's approach, a
corporate definition of ownership does not equate control with "the
equivalent of an ownership interest," but rather makes control one indicia of an "ownership interest."' 147 Even if one assumes that the court's
novel analysis is correct, however, the participants' significant control in
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

See supra text accompanying note 38.
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, § 383.
See Participants' Agreement, supra note 36, § 13(a)(iii).
WPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
See id., 666 P.2d at 337.

Id, 666 P.2d at 337.
See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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the key areas1 48 described above demonstrates that the court's conclusion was ill considered. Thus, even under the court's approach, the foregoing examination of the participants' role in the management of the
projects yields the conclusion that the participants' power to acquire
and construct generating facilities authorized them to enter into the
Participants' Agreements.
3.

Strict Construction

Even assuming that the WPPSS court was correct in finding that
the participants lacked both an ownership interest and sufficient management control to constitute the equivalent of an ownership interest, it
does not necessarily follow that the participants lacked authority to
enter into the Participants' Agreements. Although the court found that
the requirement of "ownership control" was "envisioned in the statutes,"' 49 this finding apparently resulted from the court's strict construction of the statutory language.' 50 Because a municipal entity is
generally held to be exercising a proprietary power15 ' when it undertakes the construction or acquisition of generating facilities, 152 a liberal
53
construction of the statute would have been more appropriate.
If the court had employed a more liberal construction, it would
have concluded that the participants' purchase of project capability was
authorized by the statutes. Financing the construction of generating facilities through the purchase of project capability is a means consistent154 with the general objective of the authorizing statute to empower
municipal entities to furnish electrical energy to municipal inhabitants,
securing energy sources to satisfy future needs, and obtain energy at
cost.' -55 Given the perceived unavailability of alternative sources of
See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
WPPM, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
150
The majority's reliance on the statutory scheme to demonstrate a legislative intent
"that cities and PUD'sshouldretain significant control over the use of any facilities acquired,"
id at 788, 666 P.2d at 337 (emphasis added), is misplaced. The Code merely assures the PUD
full authority "to sell and regulate and control the use, distribution, rates, service, charges,
and price" of any power generated "freefrom thefrisdict'on andcontrolof the public service commission. " WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.16.040 (1962) (emphasis added). The clear implication
of the statutory language is that the legislature intended to grant the municipal entities freedom from governmental supervision, not that it intended to mandate that the entities retain a
requisite quantum of power over the projects.
151
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
152
2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 35.27.
153 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
154 See supra text accompanying note 85 (discussing consistency requirement).
155 See State ex rel. PUD No. I v. Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d 113, 150, 182 P.2d 706, 726
(1947)("The primary purpose of the power granted to a public utility district [to 'purchase
...electric current for sale and distribution' and to 'construct, . . . acquire,. . . and operate' generating facilities] by subsection (d) of § 6, chapter 1, Laws of 1931, Rem. Rev. Stat.
§ 11610(d), is to furnish the district, and the inhabitants thereof, with electric current."); id
(PUD would be warranted under the same authorizing statute to acquire generating facilities
148

149
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power, 5 6 the participants' purchase of project capability to finance the
57
construction of the projects may have been not only a reasonable
means of carrying out the authorizing statute's purposes, but also a necessary means.
Furthermore, if the court's strict construction of the statutes was
dictated solely by its "public policy" concern that "the enormous risk to
ratepayers"'15 8 be balanced by a requirement of ownership or substantial
management control, the court's approach was clearly inappropriate.
The court's view of Washington's public policy in this area is at odds
with that set forth by the state legislature in recent amendments to the
JOA statutes. In the amendments, the legislature acknowledged the
participants' authority to "participate in," that is, to purchase the project capability of, an electrical generator construction project. 59 It is
well settled that the court may not ignore express legislative policy or
substitute for that policy one of the court's own making. 160 The state
legislature explicitly considered the risk to ratepayers of their municipal
entity's "participation" in a joint development project; 16 1 the legislature
"to adequately meet present and future ascertainable needs of the district and the inhabitants
thereof.").
156 See supra note 91.
157 See supra text accompanying note 89 (discussing reasonableness standard).
158
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337.
159 The 1983 amendment to § 43.52.410 reads:
Any city or district is authorized to enter into contracts or compacts with any
operating agency or a publicly or privately owned public utility for the
purchase and sale of electric energy or falling waters: provided, That no city or
district may enter into a contract or compact with an operating agency to
purchase electric energy, or to purchase orparticipatein a portion of an electrical generating project, that commits the city or district to pay an amount in
excess of an express dollar amount in excess of an express rate per unit of
electrical energy received.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.410 (Supp. 1984-85) (emphasis added).
A 1981 amendment to § 43.52.550 provides:
Any municipal corporation, cooperative or mutual which has entered into a
contract with an operating agency toparticipate in the constructionor acquisitionof
an energy plant as defined in chapter 80.50 RCW shall annually adopt a plan
for the repayment of its contractual share of any operating agency obligation
which matures prior to the planned operation of the plant.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.550 (1983) (emphasis added); cf.id. ch. 54.44 (providing for
ownership interest by contracting utility in generating project).
As further evidence of the legislature's view of public policy in this area, it should be
noted that the legislature, with full awareness of the provisions of the Participants' Agreements in the projects, repeatedly acquiesced in the Participants' Agreements. See Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 35, at 19-24 (citing I Senate Energy and Utilities Committee, Causesof
Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays on the Five WPPSS Nuclear Power Plants ch. 5 (Jan. 1981) and
Report to the Washington State Legislature on Projects I and 5, Independent Review of WPPSS Nuclear
Plants 4 and 5 (Mar. 1982)).
160 See Gazzan v. Building Sev. Employees Int'l Union, Local 262, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188
P.2d 97 (1947); Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. 2d 793, 180 P.2d 573 (1947); In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935).
161
See supra note 159.
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evidently concluded either that an ownership or management control
requirement was unnecessary in light of the specific safeguards incorporated into the amendments or that other interests outweighed the benefit of such a requirement. Thus, the court could not properly use this risk
as a justification for denying the municipal participants', authority to
enter into the Participants' Agreements. Based on the legislature's recently declared view of public policy, the court should not have voided
the Participants' Agreements.
C.

The JOA Statutes

The JOA statutes authorized the participants to "enter into contracts or compacts with any operating agency or a publicly or privately
owned public utility for the purchase and sale of electric energy or falling waters. 1 62 The WPPSS court held that this language did not authorize the participants to assume "dry-hole" risk. In so holding, the
court effectively precluded a major means of financing for these joint
projects and thereby threatened to defeat the major purpose of the JOA
statutes: to encourage the joint development and provision of future
63
power sources. 1
In a JOA project financing, a "dry-hole" provision serves primarily
to ensure the marketability of the JOA's bonds. 164 By placing the respective credits of all the participants behind the bonds, rather than
only that of the issuing agency, the market receives the bonds favorably.' 65 As one commentator has explained:
[F]rom a financial standpoint the primary source of revenue for payment of debt service [by the JOA] is payments received under the
power sales contracts with the municipal utilities. Consequently, the
agency's bonds could not be readily marketed if receipt by the agency
of amounts under the power sales contracts was conditional, since
there could be no assurance that there would be a continuing source
66
of revenue to service the bonds.'
A "dry-hole" provision thus assures investors that the participants are
fully "locked into" the financing plan and will be accountable in the
event of an emergency.
A "dry-hole" provision further enhances the marketability of a
JOA's bonds by imposing the risk of non-completion of the projects on
the participants and not on the bondholders. 16 7 Because prospective
162

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.410 (1983).

163

See Public Utility Joint Operating Agencies Act of 1957, 1957 Wash. Laws 1171 (codi-

fied as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 43.52 (1983)).
164 See Ferdon, supra note 5, at 18.
165 See id
166

Id
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bondholders have other investment options, they would be unwilling to
invest in a JOA project financing absent such an allocation of risk.
These attributes of dry-hole provisions are particularly important
to those, like the WPPSS participants, who have no alternative means of
financing available. Earlier Supply System projects' funds and revenues
generally were pledged to those projects' lenders and thus could not be
used to secure new projects' debt. 168 Further, mortgage financing was
not feasible in light of Supply System resolutions accompanying the
financing of prior projects that prohibited the Supply System from encumbering its existing assets. 169 Finally, one of the participants' principal purposes in entering into the Agreements was to avoid financing the
capital cost of the projects from their current resources. 170 The participants' assumption of "dry-hole" risk was the only available means by
which they could provide the necessary security to investors in Supply
System projects. Thus, the "dry-hole" provisions in the Participants'
Agreements were the only means available to the WPPSS participants of
carrying out the purposes of the JOA statutes.
To apply such a narrow construction to the JOA statutes as to effectively prevent financing of the projects would defeat the purpose of
the JOA statutes and render them useless. Such a construction contravenes the established rule that a statute is to be construed in such a
7
manner as to carry out, rather than defeat, its manifest purpose.' '
Therefore, the WPPSS court should have held that the JOA statutes
authorized the participants to enter into the Participants' Agreements.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Washington State Legislature enacted its joint operating
agency statutes with the goal of increasing economy and efficiency by
encouraging the joint development of the state's power resources. The
financial community has consistently viewed the "dry-hole" provision as
a commercially reasonable and necessary means of facilitating joint energy development and thereby achieving the legislature's ultimate goal.
The WPPSS court, adopting a paternalistic attitude towards its in-state
168 Revenues derived from the Supply System's ownership and operation of the Hanford
and Packwood Projects, WNP-1, WNP-2, and WNP-3, had been separately committed and
pledged under agreements and bond resolutions relating to those projects.

Further, those

agreements prohibited the Supply System from encumbering any of its assets, thus precluding
mortgage financing. See Brief of Washington Public Power Supply System re Statement of
Case, Motion to Strike Brief, and Jury Issue at 27, WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329.
169 See supra note 168.
170

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.

171

See Roza Irrigation Dist. v. State, 80 Wash. 2d 633, 637-38, 497 P.2d 166, 169 (1972);

see also 2

1973).

J.
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1118

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1094

ratepayers, has jeopardized the legislature's long-term goals in order to
bestow upon these ratepayers a short-term benefit by voiding these

provisions. 172
More importantly, the WPPSS court, in straining to find the Participants' Agreements ultra vires and therefore unenforceable, overstepped the bounds of its own authority and placed "constraints on
municipalities not intended by the Legislature."' 173 Courts should leave
a great deal of discretion to the elected officials of municipal entities
contemplating entering into these extremely complex transactions. In
the final analysis, such transactions are business transactions that are
made in the municipal entity's proprietary capacity and pose little if
any danger to municipal residents' substantive rights and liberties. Constant judicial oversight of these transactions only serves to impede efficient decisionmaking by municipal entities' elected officials. When
confronted with controversy concerning the merit, legality, or advisability of such a transaction, the courts should allow the municipal entity, as
they allow the private enterprise, to fail or succeed as it will, absent any
evidence of fraud or self-dealing in the transaction. Should any other
constraints be needed, they should come from the legislature.
David P. Wohabe

172 Any "benefits" in-state ratepayers may have derived from the outcome of the WPPSS
case may already be outweighed by the adverse effects of the decision. Washington municipal
entities, even those unaffiliated with projects WNP-4 and WNP-5, are now frequently forced
to pay higher rates in the municipal bond market. See WPPSS Bond Ruling ThreatensFinancing
in Northwest Region, Wall St. J., June 17, 1983, at 1, 14.
173 99 Wash. 2d at 810, 666 P.2d at 348 (Utter, J., dissenting).

